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Abstract—We propose power allocation among femto-base sta-
tions (femto-BSs) in a heterogeneous network (HetNet) based on
non cooperative games. A minimum level of quality of service has
to be guaranteed at macro-user terminals (macro-UTs). Femto-
BSs are unaware of the exact values of the channel parameters
between them and macro-UTs because of the lack of cooperation
and fading. First, we consider the design criterion where the
outage probability has to be below a certain threshold at macro-
UTs. The equilibrium concept is based on the Normalized Nash
Equilibrium (NNE) since it caters to the distributed setting. NNE
is unique only for a few strictly concave utility functions in
this case. We introduce the concept of Weakly Normalized Nash
Equilibrium (WNNE) which keeps the most of the appealing
features of NNE but can be extended to a wide class of utility
functions and can be incorporated with low complexity. Finally,
we consider the design criterion where the expected SINR at a
macro-UT has to be greater than a threshold. In this case, the
NNE is always unique for any strictly concave utility functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Femto-cells are low-cost base stations which extend cover-
age and provide high bit rates in high critical environments
like indoor. Thus, HetNets consisting of co-existing femto-
cells and macro-cells, are recognized as key elements of
next generation networks. Since femto-BSs and macro-base
stations (macro-BSs) operate on the same frequency band,
the interference management is a critical research problem
in HetNets. Zhao et al. [1] identified the interference caused
by femto-cell communications to downlink communications
in macro-cells as the most detrimental kind of interference
in standard HetNets. Since femto-BSs are not operated by the
network providers which typically own and control the macro-
BSs, the exact channel parameters between femto-BSs and
macro-UTsre not known by the femto-BSs. The channels fade
randomly making the interference management in the HetNets
more challenging. We investigate the power allocation at the
femto-BSs in presence of random channel gains under global
constraints on a minimum level of quality-of-service to be
guaranteed at the macro-UTs.
We consider a system of multiple femto-BSs and multiple
macro-UTs. We formulate the power allocation problem at
the femto-BSs as a coupled-constrained non cooperative game
with femto-BSs as players. In order to minimize the coopera-
tion and signaling, we assume that a femto-BS does not know
the exact value of the channel parameter between itself and
the macro-UTs, it only knows their probability distributions.
We consider two design criteria in order to maintain an
acceptable level of quality-of-service at the macro-UTs: i) The
outage probability must be below a certain threshold, ii) The
expectation of the signal-to-interference and noise ratio (SINR)
at each macro-UT must be above a certain threshold.
We resort to the concept of NNE introduced in [6] since
it caters to the distributed setting which we discuss in Sec-
tion III-C. When we consider the first design criterion, the
constraints reduce to posynomials [12] for Rayleigh fading
channels and the coupled constrained game is not concave
in general. Using the techniques of geometric programming
we convert the set of constraints into a standard convex form
through a variable transformation. The transformed game is
not concave for well known functions e.g. Shannon Capacity
function. Thus, the concept of NNE can not be applied for
those utility functions. Nevertheless, we identify a class of
utility functions of practical interests which are also strictly
concave for the transformed game. We show that the NNE
is unique for those games. We also propose a distributed
algorithm which converges to the unique NNE where a femto-
BS does not need to exchange information with other femto-
BSs and a macro-UT only needs to keep track of the total
interference. Since a large number of utility functions can not
be cast into the concave game framework for the transformed
problem, we resort to the concept of WNNE [10] which retains
most of the useful properties of NNE and can be incorporated
in a distributed setting.
We show that the game is always concave under the second
design criterion. In this case the NNE is unique for strictly
concave utility functions including the Shannon Capacity func-
tion unlike under the first design criterion. We also propose a
distributed algorithm which converges to the unique NNE for
any strictly concave utility function. Finally, we numerically
investigate the characteristic of NNE strategy profiles under
two design criteria in Section V.
In [2], [11], the power allocation problem in HetNets is
formulated as a Stackelberg game with macro-BSs as leaders
and femto-BSs as followers. However, this two-tier game does
not match with the 5G driving concept where the downlink
transmission in macro-cells is optimized via cooperation of
the macro-UTs. In our previous work [10], we focus only
on femto-BSs and we adopt the concept of NNE to design
a distributed algorithm for power allocation among them. All
the papers mentioned above assumed that the femto-BSs know
the channel parameters perfectly.
Recently, [3] and [4] proposed power allocation algorithm
in HetNets with uncertainty of channel gains. The former work
adopts the framework of non cooperative game among femto-
BSs constrained by second design criterion. In contrast to
our work, the distributed algorithm proposed there requires
the knowledge of the transmitted power from each femto-BS
at each macro-UT and moreover, their approach can not be
extended to the first design criterion. In [4] the authors con-
Fig. 1. Macro-BS, macro-UTs, femto-BSs and femto-UTs in a region. Circles
represent the range of base stations. Macro-BS has higher coverage compared
to femto-BS.
sider a distributed implementation of sum-rate maximization
at high SNR regime with a single constraint on the maximum
outage probability. Since femto-BSs are not managed by a
single entity, thus each femto-BS only tries to maximize its
own utility and thus, non cooperative game theoretic setting
is more realistic approach for the analysis. The equilibrium
selection concept does not arise in [4] and it is a salient feature
of our game theoretic model. Moreover, the optimization
framework considered in [4] does not offer the flexibility of
our proposed approach in terms of utility functions and number
of constraints. Additionally, [4] does not consider constraints
on the expected SINR at each macro-UT.
Notation. Vectors are denoted by bold lower case letter;
·T denotes the transpose operator; the notation x  0 stays
for componentwise inequality. Given the real x, (x)+ =
max(x, 0). The vector v−i is obtained from vector v by sup-
pressing the ith component. 1 denotes the indicator function.
exp(y) = (exp(y1), . . . , exp(yF )).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a HetNet consisting of F femto-BSs equipped
with single antenna and serving a single femto-UT per channel
use and M macro-UTs (fig. 1). The macro-UTs can be served
by different macro-BSs or the same macro-BS. We do not
make any assumptions regarding the distribution of femto-
BSs, femto-UTs and macro-UTs except the fact that femto-
UT is located close to its serving femto-BS. The channel gain
between femto-BS f and femto-UT f is denoted by hf ; ĥfm is
the channel gain between femto-BS f and macro-UT m. We
denote the channel gain between the serving macro-BS and
macro-UT m as hm. The femto-BS f transmits with power
pf ≥ 0. For future use, it is convenient to define the following





m, . . . , ĥ
F
m)
T , with m = 1, . . . ,M,.
Due to the tight co-ordination between femto-BS f and its
served femto-UT f , we assume that femto-BS f knows its
channel gain hf . We also assume that hf is constant. Since
the communications in the macro-cells and femto-cells are
uncoordinated and the channel gain also fluctuates randomly
due to the fading, thus, we assume that femto-BS f does not
have the exact values of ĥm,m = 1 . . . ,M but it has the
statistical Channel State information (CSI) i.e. it knows the
probability distribution of ĥm,m = 1 . . . ,M . In general, ĥfm






where µ̂fm is the path loss component from femto-BS f to
macro-UT m which corresponds to the signal attenuation
because of the distance, the shadowing effect and the antenna
gain between femto-BS f and macro-UT m . The above
component is assumed to be constant throughout this work.
In (1), rfm models Rayleigh Fading [5]. r
f
m is a exponentially
distributed random variable with mean 1. Hence, ĥfm is an
exponentially distributed random variable with mean µ̂fm.





where σ2 is the variance of the additive white Gaussian
noise that also accounts for interference from macro-BSs. We
assume that the interference at a femto-UT from adjacent
femto-BSs is negligible. SNR (γf ) is only a function of pf .
When it is convenient, we explicitly point out this dependence
by writing γf (pf ), otherwise we use the short notation γf .
A. Constraint at macro-UT
The Signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR) at macro-
UT m is given by
SINRm =
phm
pT ĥm + σ
2
(3)
where p is the signal power of macro-BS and σ2 is the variance
of additive Gausian Noise at macro-UT m. The femto-BS does
not know the exact values of hm. Thus same as for ĥfm we
assume that h̄m is an exponentially distributed random variable
with mean νm. In order to guarantee the quality of service at a
macro-UT, the SINR at a macro-UT has to be above a certain
threshold γth. Thus, we enforce the constraint–
SINRm ≥ γth (4)
For notational simplicity we consider the threshold γth is the
same for all macro-UTs. The generalization of the model to
consider different thresholds is straightforward. From (3) we
can also represent (4) as




The right hand side of the above inequality (i.e. Im) is an




µm. We assume macro-UT m and all femto-BSs know µm.
We consider two different design criteria:
1) Assuming that macro-UT m,m = 1, . . . ,M suffers from
the outage when the inequality in (5) is not satisfied, the
femto-BSs need to guarantee that the outage probability is
lower than a given value ε > 0, or equivalently,
Pr(pT ĥm + σ
2 ≤ Im) ≥ 1− ε m = 1, . . . ,M (6)
2) The second design criterion is based in the fact that the
expected value of SINRm must be greater than γth i.e. for










pT ĥm + σ
2
) ≥ γth (7)
The last equality follows because of the independence
between ĥm and hm. Since 1/x is convex in x for positive








E(pT ĥm + σ
2)
(8)
Hence, simplifying (8) the constraint (7) will be satisfied
if the following holds:
F∑
f=1
E(ĥfm)pf ≤ µm − σ2 for m = 1, . . . ,M (9)
First, we consider the setting where femto-BSs must have to
satisfy the constraint in (6) in Section III. Subsequently, we
consider the setting where they have to satisfy the constraint
in (9) in Section IV.
III. POWER ALLOCATION FOR MAXIMUM OUTAGE
PROBABILITY CONSTRAINT
A. Game formulation
Each femto-BS selects its transmission power with the
objective of maximizing the quality of its communication
in downlink. Its communication quality is characterized by
Uf (γf ), where Uf (·) is a concave nondecreasing function.
We formulate the power allocation at femto-BSs as a non-
cooperative game where each femto-BS aims to maximize its
own utility Uf (γf ) under constraints (6).
More specifically, we define this non-cooperative game in
a strategic form as
G = {F ,P, {uf (p)}f∈F} (10)
where the elements of the game are
• Player set: Set of the femto-BSs F = {1, ..., F};
• Strategy set: P = {p|p ∈ RF+ and constraint (6)} where
RF+ is the product space of F nonnegative real spaces R+.
• Utility set: The utility functions uf (p) are defined as





, being Uf (·) : R+ →
R+ a concave nondecreasing function in R+.
We adopt a NE of the non-cooperative game G as a power
allocation policy for the femto-BSs of the heterogeneous
network. More specifically, the power allocation vector p∗ is














for all pf such that (p∗1, . . . p
∗




F ) ∈ P. NE is in
general not unique for coupled constrained game. Rosen has
introduced the concept of NNE in [6] which provides a useful
equilibrium selection criterion for concave games. Thus, we
focus on the concave games.
B. Convexification–Concave Game
We must have convex P for concave games. However the
constraint in (6) is not convex in general. But, we reduce it into
a convex form for the Rayleigh fading channel. Since ĥfmpf is
an exponentially distributed random variable with mean µ̂fmpf ,
thus, similar to [13] we obtain from (6)
Pr(pT ĥm + σ













Note that the denominator of (12) is a posynomial [12] and
we can proceed in similar manner of geometric programming (
[12]) to represent the strategy set in the standard convex form.
Since pf ≥ 0, we can set yf = log(pf ) and thus, using (12)















Taking logarithm of both sides we can equivalently express


















which is a convex function in y. We assume that the r.h.s
of (14) is always positive, otherwise the solution will not be
feasible. Also note that the constraint in (6) has been reduced
to (13) and then we take the logarithm to obtain (14). Thus,
(14) is equivalent to the following
log(Pr(pT ĥm + σ
2 ≤ Im)) ≥ log(1− ε)
Equivalently, log(Pr(pT ĥm + σ2 > Im)) ≤ log(ε) (15)
We use the above constraint to propose a distributed algorithm
in Section III-F.
Change of decision variable: In consistence with the change
of decision variables yf = log(pf ), we consider an equivalent
game G̃ = {F , P̃, ũf (y)} where P̃ is the set of constraints




, thus, ũf (y) = Ũf (γf (exp(yf ))). Again we
use γf (exp(yf )) to show the dependence of γf on exp(yf )
otherwise we use γf .
C. Normalized Nash Equilibrium
Since pf = exp(yf ), femto-BS f can uniquely obtain pf
once it knows yf due to the monotonicity of exponential
function. We henceforth, consider the equilibrium strategy for
the game G̃.
Since constraints in (14) is convex and closed, thus the
modified P̃ is convex and closed. Moreover, if Ũf (·) is
concave in yf we can use the necessary and sufficient KKT
conditions for constrained maxima (see, e.g. [7]) to obtain
conditions satisfied by a NE y∗. If y∗ is a NE in P̃ , then,
there exist F vectors λf = (λf1 , λ
f
2 . . . , λ
f
M ) with λ
f ≥ 0
































f = 1, . . . F (17)
We can also represent the Lagrangian for femto-BS f using










2 > Im))− log(ε))
(18)
y∗ is a normalized Nash equilibrium (NNE) if KKT conditions
in (16)-(17) are satisfied with λf = λ for all f ∈ F i.e.
the Lagrangians are identical for each player. It has several
advantages: First, the Lagrangian multiplier λfm can be viewed
as the price for interference caused by player f at macro-
UT m. Thus, a macro-UT does not have to select different
prices for different players in order to implement a NNE.
Additionally, it will be clear from the distributed algorithm
proposed in Section III-F, the above property considerably
reduces the cost and the complexity of the signaling among
macro-UTs and femto-BSs. Second, if λfm = λm for all f ,
then using (18) we show that in the distributed algorithm, each
Macro-UT only needs to track the sum of the interference
in order to calculate the price for interference and does not
need to track the interference from each player. Thus, the
communication and signaling cost is significantly reduced.
Since NNE has favorable properties to be implemented in a
decentralized fashion, we henceforth examine the computing
and the uniqueness of NNE.
D. Uniqueness of Normalized Nash Equilibrium
The uniqueness of a NNE for concave games with coupled
constraints has been studied in [6]. We summarize the relevant
proposition in the following–





























If the symmetric matrix G(y)+GT (y) is negative definite for
all y ∈ P̃, then there exists a unique vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λM )
and the unique NE y∗ which satisfy all the KKT conditions in
(16)-(17) with λfm = λm for all f ∈ F and m = 1, . . . ,M ,
i.e. the NNE is unique 1.
Note that criterion in Proposition 1 is valid only when ũf (·)
is strictly concave in yf . Even though uf (·) is strictly concave
in pf , ũf (·) may not be concave in yf because of the rela-
tionship of pf = exp(yf ). For example if the utility function
is Shannon Capacity function i.e. Ũf (γf ) = log(1 + γf ).




not concave in yf , in fact it is convex in yf , but uf (p) =
log(1+γf (pf )) is concave in pf . Hence, Proposition 1 can not
1The condition is sufficient, but not necessary. In [6] a weaker condition is
provided for the uniqueness of NNE. We do not consider that property since
it is very difficult to verify that condition in practice.
be applied to the proposed example and NNE is not defined for
such functions since it does not fall in the classical framework
of concave games with coupled constraints. ũf (·) does not
depend on y−f , thus, non-diagonal elements of G(y) are
always zero and the diagonal elements of G(y) are
∂2ũf
∂y2f
= Ũ ′′f (
∂γf
∂yf














If the above is negative, then the condition in Proposition 1
is readily satisfied. However, it is not straightforward to
determine whether some concave nondecreasing functions
Ũf (exp(yf )) yield strictly concave utility functions in y. In
the following, we propose some utility functions of practical
interest which yield the games G̃ with unique NNE.
As a first example, we consider the following utility function






For certain applications the utility function of interest behaves
as a logarithmic function of the throughput (Shannon Capac-
ity). Hence, the above utility function is also of interest from
a practical point of view.
The concavity of utility functions ũf in y is shown in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. ũf (exp(yf ), exp(y−f )) = log(log(1 +
exp(yf )hf
σ2













































Hence, ũf (·) is strictly concave in yf .




for α 6= 1.
• The above utility function corresponds to α proportional fair
utility in SNR. When α = 2, it corresponds to harmonic fair
utility in SNR.2
2It is also known as delay minimization utility, because when α = 2, 1−α
is negative, thus it corresponds to minimization the delay which is proportional
to γ−1f in M/M/∞ queue.
When pf = exp(yf ), then







By differentiating twice the above function, it is straightfor-
ward to discern that Ũf (·) (and thus, ũf ) is strictly concave
in yf only when α > 1. The social utility is also maximized
at the NNE strategy profile.
E. Computing NNE
By following the same lines as in our previous work [10]
we can show that Φ(y) =
∑F
f=1 ũf (y) is a potential function
[8] of the game G̃ and we can obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. The NNE of the game G̃ with ũf (·) as defined
in (21) or (22) is equivalent to the solution of the following
convex optimization problem CCPG-IN if ũf (·) is strictly






subject to (14)(or (15)) for m = 1, . . . ,M.
Thus, the computation of the NNE is equivalent to solving
a convex optimization problem and the maximum of social
utility is attained at the NNE.
F. Distributed Algorithm
Based on Proposition 2 we provide a distributed algorithm
which converges to the unique NNE solution y∗ and yields
Lagrangian multipliers λ∗ if ũf (·) is strictly concave in yf .
For convenience, we assume that the femto-BSs only transmit
in particular time slots.
Algorithm DIST-IN:
Initially macro-UT m selects λ0 ∈ RM+ \ {0} randomly.
Each power update iteration consists of N time slots. At
power update iterations k = 0, 1, . . . , the following tasks are
performed:
1) Each femto-BS f sets
ykf = argmax
yf≥0








All the femto-BSs update the power level pk =
(pk1 , p
k
2 , . . . p
k




f ). Femto-BS transmits
with power pk at each time slot in [kN+1, . . . , (k+1)N ].
2) Macro-UT m does the following for the time slots [kN +
1, . . . , (k + 1)N ]:
• It keeps track of the total outage events Nk during the
time slots [kN+1, . . . , (k+1)N ]. Specifically, macro-UT
m keeps track of the total interference ĥm
T
pk at each
time slot i ∈ [kN +1, . . . , (k+1)N ] and compares with
Xi an exponentially distributed random variable with






pk + σ2 > Xi)
• At the end of time slot (k+1)N , Macro-UT m calculates













Macro-UT m reports the updated cost λk+1m to all the
femto-BSs.
The convergence of Algorithm DIST-IN follows immediately
from known results in [9] and the law of large numbers. It is
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Algorithm DIST-IN converges almost surely to
the unique optimal primal solution y∗ and dual solution λ∗
for large enough N 3 when Ũf (·) or ũf , f = 1, . . . , F is
strictly concave in yf .
Since Ũf (·) as defined in (21) and (22) are strictly concave
in yf (and thus, ũf ) thus, algorithm DIST-IN converges to the
unique NNE for those functions.
Femto-BSs do not need to exchange information with each
other to implement the algorithm DIST-IN. Macro-UT m
keeps track of the total interference but it does need to know
µ̂fm, ĥ
f
m or pf . In practice it is very difficult to obtain those
values, thus our model is readily scalable and implementable in
practice. Each macro-UT estimates the outage probability us-
ing the value of the total observed interference and generating
a sequence of random variables before updating the price for
causing interference. We show in Section V that the N = 200
is sufficient for the distributed algorithm to converge.
G. Weakly Normalized NE
We observe that NNE may not be unique or even may not
be defined for some useful functions e.g. Shannon Capacity
functions under the constraints in (14). However, NEs exist for
those functions. We can still incorporate a NE which retains
most of the properties of NNE for those functions by using
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let G̃ ≡
{





F , P̃, {Vf (γf (exp(yf )))}f∈F
}
be two games of the
kind defined in (10) with identical player and strategy sets but
different utility sets. Let the functions Vf and Ũf , f ∈ F , be
strictly increasing functions in γf . Then, if y is a NE of game
G̃, then it is also a NE for game Ḡ.
Proof: Assume that y∗ is a NE for G̃ but not for Ḡ. Then,
there exists a yf such that (yf ,y∗−f ) ∈ P̃ and
Vf (γf (exp(yf ))) > Vf (γf (exp(y
∗
f ))).
Vf is increasing then γf (exp(yf )) > γf (exp(y∗f )). Since Ũf
is an increasing function in γf thus,
Ũf (γf (exp(yf ))) > Ũf (γf (exp(y
∗
f ))).
This contradicts the assumption that y∗ is a NE for G̃. Thus,
y∗ is a NE for both G̃ and Ḡ. 
We now define weakly normalized Nash equilibrium
(WNNE) introduced in [10] using Proposition 4.
3As N → ∞ Pr(Nk = 0) → 0 and thus, by the strong law of large
numbers converge to the outage probability almost surely
Definition 1. [10] Let game G̃ with utility set U ≡
{Ũf (γf )|f ∈ F} and strictly increasing Ũf (·) have a NNE
y. Then y is also a NE of the game Ḡ with utility set
V ≡ {Vf (γf )|f ∈ F} and strictly increasing Vf (·). This NE
y will be denoted as the Weakly Normalized Nash equilibrium
(WNNE) of Ḡ with respect to the utility set U .
Note that Ũf (γf ) = log(log(1+γf )) is a strictly increasing
function of γf . Thus, by Proposition 4 the NNE of the game
G̃ is also an NE of the game Ḡ with same set of constraints
but utility function Vf (γf ) = log(1 + γf ). Thus, the unique
NNE y∗ of the game G with utility function defined in (21)
induces a WNNE y∗ in the game Ḡ with Vf = log(1 + γf ).
Though the utility function log(1 + γf ) is not concave in y,
still we can find an NE which can be implemented using the
DIST-IN algorithm. Also note that the unique NNE for the
utility functions defined in (22) also induce a unique WNNE
for Shannon Capacity functions for a given value of α > 1.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION FOR CONSTRAINED SINRS IN
EXPECTATIONS
In this section, we consider the setting where femto-BSs
have to satisfy the constraint in (9). We denote the game as
G′ = {F ,P ′,u} where P ′ is the set of constraints in (9)
and p ≥ 0. The only difference between the games G′ and
G (defined in (10)) is the strategy set. Note that the strategy
set P ′ is always convex. Thus, the game G′ always falls into
the category of coupled constrained concave game studied in
[6] and no transform of the decision variable pf is required.
Therefore, we study NNE in terms of p for the game G′.
In order to prove the uniqueness of NNE, the condition of
Proposition 1 has to be satisfied in terms of p instead of y. It
is easy to discern that the condition in Proposition 1 is satisfied
by any strictly concave function Uf (·) of pf including the
Shannon Capacity function unlike in Section III.
Moreover, similar to Proposition 2, the following proposi-
tion shows that
∑F
f=1 uf (p) is a concave potential game.
Proposition 5. The NNE of the game G′ is equivalent to the
solution of the following convex optimization problem CCPG-






subject to (9) for m = 1, . . . ,M (23)
When uf (p) is strictly concave then the solution of a convex
optimization problem is equivalent to compute a NNE and the
maximum of the social utility is attained at the NNE.
A. Distributed Algorithm
By leveraging on the results of Proposition 5 we provide
a distributed algorithm. We assume that the utilization of the
channel is slotted. The distributed algorithm is similar to a
stochastic gradient-descent approach:-
Algorithm DIST-EX
Initially macro-UT m,m = 1, . . . ,M selects λ0 ∈ RM+ \ {0}
randomly
Each femto-BS updates power after every N time slots. At
power update iteration k = 0, 1, . . . , the following steps occur:









Then, all the femto-BSs update power levels pk =
(pk1 , p
k
2 , . . . p
k
F ). All the femto-BSs transmits with power
pk at each time slots [kN + 1, . . . , (k + 1)N ].
2) Each Macro-UT m,m = 1, . . . ,M keeps track of the total
interference at each time slot [kN + 1, . . . , (k+ 1)N ] and
calculates the mean Nkm. At the end of (k + 1)N th time









Nkm − µm + σ2))+
Macro-UT m reports the updated cost λk+1m to all the
femto-BSs.
The convergence of Algorithm DIST-EX follows immediately
from known results in [9] and the strong law of large number.
This property is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. For large enough N 4 algorithm DIST-EX
converges almost surely to the unique optimal primal solution
p∗ and dual solution λ∗ when Uf (·) is strictly concave in p.
Each macro-UT only needs to track the total interference at
each iteration. It does not need to know ĥfm, µ̂
f
m and pf . Thus,
communication and signaling cost is greatly reduced. Femto-
BSs do not need to exchange information among themselves.
In Section V we observe that N = 100 is enough for
satisfactory performance of DIST-EX.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We numerically evaluate the characteristics of an NNE strat-
egy profile for several utility functions. To generate µ̂fm, hf ,
we first randomly place femto-BSs and macro-UTs in a disc
of radius r1. Then, we randomly place a femto-UT in a disc
of radius r2 around each femto-BS (fig. 1). We take r1 > r2
because in practice, a femto-UT is in a close vicinity of its
femto-BS compared to the size of a macro-cell. We assume






dfm denotes the distance between femto-BS f and macro-UT
m and β ∈ [2, 4]. We also assume hf = d−βf where df is
the distance between femto-BS f and femto-UT f . For all
simulations we take β = 2, r1 = 20, r2 = 2, σ2 = 0.1,
µm = 10 for all m = 1, . . . ,M and σ





Uf (γf (pf,NNE)) (24)
pNNE = {p1,NNE , . . . , pF,NNE} is the NNE strategy profile.
A. Minimum Outage Probability as Constraint
We set the maximum outage probability as ε = 0.05.
Since eUf (γf ) has a straightforward physical interpretation for
utility function (21) , instead of plotting Uf (γf ), fig. 2 shows
the variation of eUf (γf ) at the NNE of the game for utility
function (21) with the number of macro-UTs. Intuitively, as







Fig. 2. exp(Uf ), f = 1, 2, 3 versus number of
macro-UTs when utility function is given by (21)
and F = 3.
Fig. 3. UNNE and Uf for utility function stated
in (22) versus number of macro-UTs for F = 3.
Fig. 4. Total utility at WNNE versus the number of
macro-UTs for F = 3. UWNNE,1 corresponds to
utility at the NNE for utility function (22) (α = 2)
and UWNNE,2 corresponds to the total utility at
the NNE for the utility function (21).
Fig. 5. Convergence analysis of Algorithm DIST-
IN forN = 200, F = 3 andM = 5. The left hand
side figure corresponds to the utility functions (21)
and the right hand side corresponds to the utility
functions (22) with α = 2.
Fig. 6. Total and individual utility at NNE for
Shannon Capacity function with F = 3 versus the
number of macro-UTs.
Fig. 7. Convergence analysis of Algorithm DIST-
EX for N = 100, F = 3 and M = 5. The total
utility is plotted against the iterations. The left and
right hand side correspond to the utility function
Uf = log(1 + γf ) and Uf = log(log(1 + γf ))
respectively.
the number of macro-UTs increase, the strategy set P̃ shrinks
and the additional constraints imply that the power with which
femto-BSs transmit decrease. Since the sum of utilities (21)
corresponds to the proportional throughput, the utilities of
femto-BSs are concentrated in a small range.
Fig. 3 shows that the individual utility and the total utility
decreases when the number of macro-UTs increases for utility
function (22) with α = 2. Because of the harmonic fair
allocation, only one of the femto-BSs reduces its power but
others transmit with almost the same power even when the
number of macro-UTs increases as shown in Fig. 3.
In fig. 4 we study the Shannon Capacity function i.e.
Uf (γf ) = log(1 + γf ) as the utility function. There is no
NNE for this utility function as shown in Section III-D. But,
the NNE of the utility functions (21) and (22) induce two
distinct WNNEs . Surprisingly, the WNNE corresponding to
the game with utility function (22) with α = 2 provides higher
(lower, respectively) total utility compared to the WNNE
corresponding to the game with utility function (21) when the
number of macro-UTs is high (low, resp.).
Fig. 5 shows that the algorithm DIST-IN converges to the
NNE value. The rate of convergence is slower for utility
functions (22) compared to the utility functions (21).
B. Second Design Criterion
For the numerical analysis of the second design criterion
we focus on the utility function Uf (γf ) = log(1 + γf ). Note
that the NNE is unique for the above utility function in this
case. Fig. 6 shows that the total utility and individual utility
decreases as the number of macro-UTs increases since the
strategy set shrinks. When the number of macro-UTs exceeds a
certain threshold, the strategy set and thus, the utilities remain
almost the same. The utility at the NNE is higher than the
utility at the WNNEs shown in Fig. 4.
Fig. 7 shows that the distributed algorithm converges to the
NNE solution for N = 100. Beside the Shannon Capacity
function we also study the convergence of the DIST-EX algo-
rithm for the utility function Uf (γf ) = log(log(1 + γf )). The
rate of convergence is faster for Shannon Capacity function.
Convergence is faster for DIST-EX compared to DIST-IN.
REFERENCES
[1] “Interference Management in OFDMA Femtocells”, Femto Forum, March
2010, n. 012, http://femtoforum.org/fem2/resources.php.
[2] Guruacharya, Sudarshan and Niyato, Dusit and Kim, Dong In and
Hossain, Ekram, “Hierarchical competition for downlink power alloca-
tion in OFDMA femtocell networks,” Wireless Communications, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 12, n. 4, pp. 1543–1553, Apr. 2013.
[3] Kun Zhu; Hossain, E.; Anpalagan, A., ”Downlink Power Control in
Two-Tier Cellular OFDMA Networks Under Uncertainties: A Robust
Stackelberg Game,” Communications, IEEE Transactions on , vol.63,
no.2, pp.520,535, Feb. 2015.
[4] Senhua Huang, Xin Liu, Zhi Ding, ”Distributed Power Control for Cogni-
tive User Access based on Primary Link Control Feedback,” INFOCOM,
2010 Proceedings IEEE pp.1,9.
[5] John G. Proakis, “Digital Communications”, McGraw publisher, fourth
edition, 2000.
[6] J. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave
N-person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 520–534, Jul. 1965.
[7] Stephen Boyd and Lieven Vandenberghe, “Convex optimization,” Cam-
bridge University Press, New York, 2007.
[8] D. Monderer and L.S. Shapley “Potential games,” Games and Economic
Behavior, vol. 14,pp.124-143,1996.
[9] D.P. Bertsekas and J.N. Tsitsiklis “Parallel and distributed computation:
Numerical methods,” Athena Scientific, 1975.
[10] Arnob Ghosh, Laura Cottatellucci, and Eitan Altman,“Normalized Nash
Equilibrium for Power Allocation in Femto Base stations in Heteroge-
neous Network”,13th International Symposium on Modeling and Opti-
mization in Mobile, Ad-hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt), May 2015,
< hal-01134133> http://hal.inria.fr/hal-01134133/document.
[11] Yi Su and van der Schaar, M.,“A new perspective on multi-user power
control games in interference channels”, Wireless Communications, IEEE
Transactions on, vol. 8, no. 6, pp. 2910–2919,
[12] Boyd, Stephen and Kim, Seung-Jean and Vandenberghe, Lieven and
Hassibi, Arash, “A tutorial on geometric programming,” Optimization and
engineering, vol. 8, n.1, pp. 67–127, Springer, 2007.
[13] Kandukuri, Sunil and Boyd, Stephen, “Optimal Power Control in
Interference-Limited Fading Wireless Channels With Outage-Probability
Specifications”, IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, vol. 1,
no. 1, pp. 46-55, January 2002.
